The number of killed, injured, and displaced people among two million Gazans has been large and is growing. I hope my words here will contribute to a conversation on assessing the morality of Israel’s actions.

The social teaching of the Catholic Church appeals to human reason, not only to the Bible. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (1983) addresses war and peace in these relatively few words (omitting footnotes):[i]

2263 The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent that constitutes intentional killing. “The act of self-defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life; and the killing of the aggressor…. the one is intended, the other is not.”

2264 Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of morality. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one’s own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow:

If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful…. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.

2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their charge.

….

2309 The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:
– the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
– all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
– there must be serious prospects of success;
– the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

These are the traditional [four] elements enumerated in what is called the “just war” doctrine.

The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.

2312 The Church and human reason both assert the permanent validity of the moral law during armed conflict. “The mere fact that war has regrettably broken out does not mean that everything becomes licit between the warring parties.”

2313 Non-combatants, wounded soldiers, and prisoners must be respected and treated humanely…

2314 “Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.”

This document distinguishes, without using the words, between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The former deals with the right to go to war and the latter with how the war is conducted. There is some overlap between the two since there must be “serious prospects of success” and “the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.”

On October 7, Hamas broke a cease-fire that had been in place since 2014 by crossing the border from Gaza into Israel and killing 1,200 men, women and children, wounding 1,600,[ii] and taking about 250 hostages. (People say hostages, not prisoners. And people say killed but, given the methods of killing, butchered would be more correct.)

Israel decided against a limited engagement of retaliation against Hamas which Israel had done in the years following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2008, 2012, 2014,[iii] and 2021,[iv] and which it had done in response to numerous attacks in between those years.[v] Instead, Israel commenced a war (initially termed “operations”) against Hamas in October 2023 with two goals: the destruction of Hamas and the return of all hostages. It purposefully chose not to employ overwhelming force in the initial stages.[vi]

At the time Israel commenced its “operations,” did it have serious prospects of success in meeting its two goals? No one was sanguine about it. Much of the combat would be in an urban, densely populated setting.[vii] Second, Hamas had the support of the population of two million where its 25,000 non-uniformed fighters could blend in. Third, Hamas had between 350 and 450 miles of tunnels[viii] in a Gaza territory of 140 square miles, much of them under 700-plus schools[ix] and 36 hospitals.[x] That is, Hamas used the occupants of schools and hospitals and homes as human shields, contrary to the laws of war.[xi]

On the other hand, Israel wanted to break the cycle of Hamas attack, Israeli retaliation, cease-fire, reconstruction, Hamas attack, Israel retaliation, cease-fire, reconstruction. Bear in mind that these Hamas attacks are directed to the civilian population and include the taking of hostages. Israel wanted to break the cycle of take hostages, negotiate release of Palestinian prisoners, take hostages, and so on.[xii]

Not only had Hamas from its founding called for the destruction of Israel,[xiii] in the days after October 7 its leaders promised it would attack Israel “again and again and again” until Israel is eradicated.[xiv] To counter this existential threat, Israel desired, in the words of the Catechism, to “render[] the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm.”

In doing so, Israel must have believed at the outset that it could meet another criteria for a moral war, namely, whether “the use of arms [] produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.” This prudential judgment belonged to Israel, not to the United States or the world media. On the other hand, to the extent that the United States funds or arms Israel, the United States is its own moral agent and needs to make this judgment.

Now that Israel and Hamas are ten months into this war, Israel (and the United States) are able to reassess whether Israel has “serious prospects for success,” whether its “use of arms [is] produc[ing] evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated,” and whether there has been “indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants.”

In Part 2 I will address these questions regarding lives and physical destruction.

[i] https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P81.HTM

[ii] Renee Gert-Zand, “Preventative Medicine: After Oct. 7 Mass Casualty Event, Israeli MDs Share Tough Lessons,” Times of Israel, Feb. 16, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/preventative-medicine-after-oct-7-mass-casualty-event-israeli-mds-share-tough-lessons/

[iii] Yousef Al-Helou, Mohammad Awad and Sarah Lynch, “Israel, Hamas Agree to Egypt-brokered Cease-fire,” USA Today, Aug. 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/26/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire/14613107/

[iv] “A Brief History of Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Agreements,” Israel Policy Forum, Feb. 2024, https://israelpolicyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/A-Brief-History-of-Israel-Hamas-Ceasefire-Agreements.pdf

[v] Between 2005 and May 2021 “Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza have launched over 20,000 rockets and mortars at Israel, carried out more than one hundred suicide bombings.” “Understanding the Recent [2021] Conflict in Gaza,” American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), June, 2021,  https://aipacorg.app.box.com/s/zef0w44kp7ezpno1nnphw9u0v0e7kwnc.

[vi]Josef Federman, “Has Israel Invaded Gaza?,” Oct. 31, 2023, AP News, https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-ground-operation-invasion-6ba5bf06f81c315252a9e53735f3de47

[vii] AP, “The Gaza Strip: Tiny, Cramped and as Densely Populated as London,” AP News, Dec. 5, 2023,   https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-hamas-war-90e02d26420b8fe3157f73c256f9ed6a

[viii] “Gaza Tunnels Stretch at Least 350 Miles, Far Longer Than Past Estimate—Report,” Times of Israel, Jan. 16, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-tunnels-stretch-at-least-350-miles-far-longer-than-past-estimate-report/

The Israelis did not intend to destroy all the tunnels, but to render key points unusable and weaken Hamas. As of January, they had destroyed 20-40%. The aim was quality over quantity. Ruth Marks Eglash, “After Four Months of War, How Much of Gaza’s Terror Tunnel Network Remains?,” Jewish Insider, Feb. 27, 2024, https://jewishinsider.com/2024/02/israel-idf-hamas-gaza-tunnels-network-war-undergro/

[ix] “How Israel Has Destroyed Gaza’s Schools and Universities,” Al Jazeera, Jan. 24, 2024  (UNRWA data from 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/24/how-israel-has-destroyed-gazas-schools-and-universities

[x] High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell and Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, “Palestine: statement on attacks on medical and civilian infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank,” Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, May 20, 2024, Palestine: statement on attacks on medical and civilian infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank – European Commission (europa.eu)

[xi] At least between symmetric belligerents, as opposed to “asymmetric” ones like Israel and Hamas, by Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute of 1998.

[xii] For some quantitative details, see Shlomo Brody, “Rescue Israeli Hostages, But at What Cost?,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rescue-israeli-hostages-but-at-what-cost-8b44eb77

[xiii] Hamas’ 1988 charter, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp, and 2017 charter, https://web.archive.org/web/20170510123932/http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/

[xiv] MSNBC, Nov. 2, 2023. https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/hamas-official-vows-to-repeat-attacks-on-israel-again-and-again-until-it-s-destroyed-196930629782.