Even Alasdair MacIntyre, among the greatest of living Thomists, thinks that believers might do better to argue from justice rather than to appeal to human dignity. And Harvard’s Steven Pinker writes derisively of the “stupidity of dignity.” Critics admit that the rhetoric of dignity surfaces in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). But rhetoric should be kept in its place. Pinker, instead, champions autonomy. Conveniently, the most vulnerable among us have little if any autonomy.

So it is emboldening that the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, in its recent Declaration Dignitatis Infinita, doubles down on the dignity of the human being. In doing so it brings forward the teaching of Vatican II. “The dignity of man rests above all on the fact that he is called to communion with God. The invitation to converse with God is addressed to man as soon as he comes into being” (Gaudium et Spes, n. 19).

Human dignity is not limited to privileged circumstances, and the document helpfully distinguishes four of its dimensions. First comes “ontological dignity.” We are made in God’s very image.  The second, moral dignity, reflects how well we honor our freedom. It is “for freedom that we are set free” (Galatians 5: 1). The third, social dignity, finds its measure in the character of our living conditions. In the best of cases, they foster the development of human potential. In the worst of cases, they terribly limit it. The fourth, existential dignity, comes into play when we experience conditions that threaten our core sense of humanity.

As a philosopher, I welcome the emphasis that Dignitatis Infinita gives to the metaphysics of  dignity. The document affirms that “The classical definition of a person as an ‘individual substance of a rational nature’ clarifies the foundation of human dignity.” It explains that “the term ‘rational’ encompasses all the capacities of the human person, including the capacities of knowing and understanding” and “includes all corporeal functions closely related to these abilities.”

The document reflects, as well, that “We do not create our nature; we hold it as a gift” and “by exercising the freedom to cultivate the riches of our nature, we grow over time.” Because our dignity is not limited to particular circumstances, “Even if a person is unable to exercise these capabilities due to various limitations or conditions, nevertheless the person always subsists as an ‘individual substance’ with a complete and inalienable dignity.”

As a philosopher, I also welcome the recognition of Dignitatis Infinita that “reason shows that human beings are ends in themselves” and hence of inviolable worth. Showing that this is the case, of course, calls for more than a blog post. But there’s a decently brief reductio ad absurdum argument that might wet even the skeptic’s appetite for more.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, we deny that human beings have a circumstance-transcending dignity. In that case they are means rather than ends. Now if this is so, then an act is right or wrong solely due to its consequences. Down with moral absolutes!

But such consequentialism leads some of its proponents to “anti-natalism.” That is, the claim that we ought to discourage giving birth on the grounds that most new human beings, over a lifetime, promote more pain over pleasure. (An old joke has it that “Best is never to have been born. But who is so lucky? Not one in 10,000.”)

But wait! Consequentialists might just as well argue, and some do, that in light of technological advance, in the long term humans will enjoy a utopia that we can scarcely imagine. That is, they will do so unless anti-natalists have their way. Therefore we should eliminate all anti-natalists.

Both above arguments, given our epistemic limits, are equally plausible. What this suggests is that consequentialism, with its denial of the incommensurable and irreplaceable value of human beings, leads to contradictory conclusions. It is intellectually unstable and thus untenable.

To be sure, the pressing question remains: What might be the ultimate grounds of the human life that brings with it such limitless dignity? The Christian philosopher now turns to the Good News of Revelation.